European women: Why do(n't) they work? by Genre, Véronique et al.
WORKING PAPER SERIES
 





Ramón Gómez Salvador 
and Ana LamoIn 2005 all ECB 
publications 
will feature 




NO. 454 / MARCH 2005
This paper can be downloaded without charge from 
http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network 







1       The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank (ECB).




are of course the sole responsibility of the authors.
We would like to thank Neale Kennedy,Barbara Petrongolo,Jarkko Turunen and Etienne Wasmer for useful comments. Any errors© European Central Bank, 2005
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000
Telex
411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-
commercial purposes is permitted provided
that the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper do not
necessarily reflect those of the European
Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB
Working Paper Series is available from










2. Empirical model 9
12
3.1 Prime-age females’ participation 13
3.2 Participation of females aged 55-64 16
3.3 Participation of females aged 15-24 17
4. Discussion and conclusions 20
5. References 22
6. Tables and charts 24
7. Annex Data sources and definition 33
European Central Bank working paper series 35




This paper provides an empirical study of the determinants of female participation decisions in the European 
Union. The analysis is performed by estimating participation equations for different age groups (i.e. young, 
prime-age and older females), using annual data for a panel of 12 EU-15 countries over the period 1980-
2000. Our findings show that the strictness of labour market institutions negatively affects the participation 
rate.  Decisions linked to individual preferences with regards to education or fertility are also found relevant 
to participation of the youngest and prime-age females respectively. The inclusion of a proxy to capture 
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JEL classification: J21Non technical summary 
GDP per head in Europe is around 65% that of the United States and the main reason for this gap is 
the relatively low labour utilisation in European countries. In particular, Europeans work 13% less 
hours on average than Americans do. While the existence of the gap on hours worked per head is 
not disputed, there is some disagreement as how to explain it. Some argue that the gap reflects 
social norms according to which Europeans value leisure more than Americans do, while others 
put emphasis on the influence of the institutional framework, in particular the disincentive effect of 
taxes on labour. This paper indirectly contributes to this debate by analysing another aspect behind 
the relatively low labour utilisation in Europe, i.e. low participation rates. Concretely, it examines 
the determinants of women’s participation in Europe. 
Using annual data for a panel of 12 EU-15 countries over the period 1980-2000, this paper looks 
into the role that economic, institutional and social factors have played in explaining female 
participation rates and their developments in the last two decades. The analysis is performed by 
estimating participation equations for 3 different age groups (namely, the young – 15 to 24 years 
old –, the prime-age – 25 to 54 – and the older – 55 to 64 –). 
We find that the influence of general economic variables on participation is not even across age 
groups. In particular, the unemployment rate, which is meant to mainly capture labour market 
pressures arising from business cycle fluctuations, appears to have some relevance in explaining 
participation, albeit only for the youngest and prime-age women. As expected, high unemployment 
tends to have a discouragement effect on these women, who, when considering that they have little 
chance to find a job, refrain from participating to the labour force. 
For all three age groups considered, the strictness of labour market institutions negatively affects 
participation decisions. Indeed, the declining tightness of the institutional framework ruling labour 
markets in some countries over the last two decades appear to have significantly favoured 
women’s participation, in particular of the older age group. We also find that measures aimed at 
reconciling motherhood with professional life, such as maternity leave, seem to favour 
participation to the labour force. 
Along with the changing institutional framework, a number of specific decisions influenced by 
preferences, institutions and social norms appear to have driven participation developments of the 
different age groups. For example, for the younger age group, the increasing use of flexible forms 
of work (such as part-time employment) is found to explain a large part of participation 
developments between the 1980s and the 1990s. Education enrolment, which can be seen as an 
alternative to finding a job or being unemployed, is also a major driving force behind the decline in 
young female participation. Turning to prime-age female, a fertility variable, which can be seen as 
the outcome of the decision to have children versus participation to the labour force, significantly 
curbs labour force participation. Finally, the participation of the oldest age group appears 
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March 2005earlier age, they are not likely to participate at an older age. Once again, this points to the influence 
of cultural habits and social norms. 
In sum, our results discard any doubt on the influence of institutions on women’s participation in 
Europe. Institutional factors, together with preferences and economic factors have shaped female 
participation decisions. Identifying these factors is all the more important since it appears as a 
prerequisite to the successful design of efficient policy measures. These measures should help 
attract female labour supply into the labour force, raise female participation towards the targets set 
by the 2000 Lisbon European Council and help Europe to be more dynamic and catch-up with the 
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GDP per capita in Europe was around 65% of US GPD per capita in 2003.  One possible reason 
for this gap is that Europeans work less than Americans do. Indeed, the ratio of hours worked per 
person in the EU-15 relative to the hours worked per person in the US was around 77% in 2000, 
which represents a significant decrease from a ratio of around 100% in 1970. This decrease was 
coupled however with an increase in relative productivity that left relative GDP per capita broadly 
unchanged, i.e. the increase in productivity did not have a catch-up effect in relative GDP per 
capita because labour utilisation in Europe was clearly below that of the US. In other words, if 
Europeans were prepared to work as many hours per person as Americans, GDP per capita in the 
EU-15 would be comparable to that of the US.  
While the existence of the gap on hours worked per capita is not disputed, there is some 
disagreement as how to explain it. The debate on whether Europeans work less due to preferences 
or due institutional features of the labour market has recently attracted considerable growing 
interest. 
The paper that initiated this debate was Blanchard (2004); Blanchard decomposes the change in 
hours worked per person as the sum of the change in hours worked per worker, the change in the 
ratio of employment to the labour force and the participation rate. He shows that the decrease in 
hours worked per person in EU-15 relative to the US during the period 1970-2000 is only due to a 
decrease in the number of hours worked per worker, with no substantial change in the relative 
growth (EU-15 vs. US) of employment and participation rates.  
Blanchard argues then that the fact hours per worker (in particular full time workers) is responsible 
for the decrease in worked hours per capita is an indication that Europeans work less because they 
prefer to do so, thus valuing leisure relatively more than Americans. 
Prescott (2004) and Ueberfelt (2004) on the other hand, find that some institutional features, in 
particular taxes, play a determining role in shaping the dynamics of hours worked per capita. 
However, the latter papers do not disentangle whether the effect of taxes is via hours per worker, 
via employment and/or via participation rates.  
This paper contributes indirectly to this debate by examining the determinants of just one of the 
components of worked hours per capita: the participation rate; and more precisely female 
participation rates in Europe. We think that increasing the female participation rate in Europe is a 
feasible channel for increasing hours worked per capita and in turn GDP per capita. Indeed, 
participation levels in Europe are low, implying that around 76 million people aged between 15 
and 64 are currently not actively participating in the labour market, the so-called inactives, of 
which two-thirds are women.  
                                                      
  Europe in this paper refers to the 15 members European Union prior to the May 2004 enlargement. Both terms 
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1
1Labour market participation in the EU-15 has increased from 65% in the mid-1970s to nearly 70% 
in 2000 (see Chart 1), led by the positive contribution of female participation, which grew by more 
than 12 percentage points to reach around 60% in 2000.  A similar increase in overall participation 
was recorded in the US over the same period, but EU-15 participation rate in 2000 was no higher 
than that of the US three decades earlier (in the 1970s). In 2000, the gap between US and European 
participation still reached 12 percentage points for women and 5 percentage points for men. 
This paper seeks to identify the determinants of the evolution of female participation in Europe. 
The analysis is performed by estimating women participation equations for three different age 
groups (young (15-24 years old), prime-age (25-54) and older age groups (55-64)) using annual 
macro data for a panel of 12 of the EU-15 countries over the period 1980-2000.    
The separate analysis for each one of the relevant age groups of potentially active women can be 
easily justified. For example, fertility decisions are key for prime-age women but irrelevant for the 
old ones, while other factors such as social protection are important determinants for old women.  
An innovative feature of our paper is its focus on institutions as explanatory factors for 
participation rates. The analysis of the effects of institutions on unemployment and employment 
has largely developed in recent years since the dataset compiled by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) 
and Nickell and Nunziata (2001) have become available. Nickell (1997), Elmeskov et al. (1998), 
Belot and van Ours (2000, 2001) and Bertola et al. (2003) are some examples of studies that focus 
on the direct effect of institutions, while Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Jimeno and Rodriguez-
Palenzuela (2001) and Nunziata (2002) follow an approach based on the interactions between 
institutions and shocks. We exclusively focus on the direct impact of institutions. To our 
knowledge this paper is among the first ones to look at the impact that institutions could have on 
participation decisions, other examples are Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) who analyse retirement 
decisions and Jaumotte (2003), which also looks at females’ participation. 
Our findings discard any doubt on the influence of institutions on women’s participation in Europe. 
Institutional factors can shape female participation decisions and therefore the dynamics of worked 
hours per capita and, in turn, GDP per capita and economic growth in the EU. However the degree 
to which these factors shape or interact with preferences is outside the scope of this paper.  
The strictness of labour market institutions negatively affects the participation decisions in the 
three groups considered. Indeed, changes in rules or in features that increased the overall flexibility 
of labour market institutions in many European countries in recent years (e.g. declining union 
density, decreasing employment protection, tightening of eligibility criteria for unemployment 
benefits, etc.) have generally supported female participation. We also find that institutional features 
                                                      
 By comparison, male participation rates fell by more than five percentage points to around 78% over the same period. 
 Countries include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 









3aimed at reconciling motherhood with professional life such as maternity leave schemes favour 
participation of prime-age women.  
More linked to preferences, but also to social norms and institutions, fertility and education 
decisions have been dominant forces in determining the evolution of participation rates during the 
sample period considered for prime-age and young females respectively, while the extensive use of 
part-time employment has been relevant for both age groups. Finally, cohort effects, which are also 
linked to institutions, preferences and social norms, appear to be crucial to understand the 
developments in participation for oldest females.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical model and discusses how the 
overall institutional framework and other variables traditionally suggested by economic theory are 
expected to influence labour market participation of women. Section 3 reviews the stylised facts 
and presents the estimation results Section 4 discusses the main findings and gives some 
conclusions. 
 
2. Empirical model 
The general version of the empirical participation equation estimated for each group is the 
following: 
Log (PRit / 1- PRit )= βXit+ γZit  + bt+ci + εit  . 
The dependent variable is the logit transformation of participation rates of each group, for country 
i and period t. The participation rate is a variable bounded between zero and one. This can be taken 
into account by specifying the regression of participation rates on the conditioning variables as 
E(PRit) = F (βXit + γZit  + bt+ci), where F is a probability distribution function. If F is chosen to be 
a logistic function, this model will lead to a linear equation with the transformed variable 
log[(PRit/1-PRit)] as the dependent variable.  bt and ci are period and country effects respectively.  
The explanatory variables include a range of plausible determinants of each age group’s 
participation rate. These determinants may be organised into two main groups. Vector Zit gathers 
variables traditionally suggested by standard economic theory and usually found in empirical 
studies. Vector Xit is meant to bring together variables reflecting the institutional framework ruling 
European labour markets and general preferences. 
For all age groups, the vector of market institutions Xit includes the following elements:  union 
density, employment protection, unemployment benefit systems and labour taxes, all of the taken 
from Nickel and Nunziata (2001). These variables are time varying and are available until 1998. In 
                                                      
  The estimations in this paper were also performed using the actual (non-transformed) participation rate as dependent 
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4
4addition, this vector includes a number of institutional features that are thought to be specific to 
each age group and will be discussed in more details in Section 3.  
The relevance of the institutional framework as a determinant of female participation decisions can 
be discussed on the basis of a standard “insider-outsider” model, in which prime-age males could 
be seen as insiders because they show a more stable attachment to the labour market, while women 
Union density, defined as the ratio of union members to total employees, is a labour market 
institutional feature expected to be an important determinant of participation.  The involvement of 
unions in the wage bargaining  will lead to a higher wage compression and larger employment 
differences between insiders and outsiders, which will impact on the expectations of outsiders to 
get a job. Therefore, we expect more unionised economies to display lower average participation 
rates among the less attached workers, hence, women. During the 1980s and the 1990s, union 
density has declined in many countries and may have favoured a convergence in participation rates 
among age and gender groups.   
Employment protection is another institutional feature that should play an important role in 
determining participation, while the overall influence may go in any direction. A stringent 
employment protection framework should restrain employers’ willingness to hire and fire workers. 
As a result, employment, hence, participation rates of workers with numerous lapses of inactivity 
should be negatively affected. At the same time, employment protection is also meant to provide a 
positive incentive to participate in a labour market where risks of getting unemployed are smaller. 
Employment protection is measured as a range from 0 to 2 depending on the relative strictness of 
employment protection in each European country. In general, employment protection is high in all 
European countries, but the strictness of it has significantly declined over the last two decades. 
The potential effects of unemployment benefits on participation follow a similar mechanism to the 
one of employment protection. To the extent that a more generous unemployment benefit coverage 
strengthens union bargaining strategies, it would reduce the employment rates of the outsiders and 
indirectly, their participation rates. On the other hand, however, the existence of more generous 
unemployment benefit systems could represent a positive incentive to participate in the labour 
market from the viewpoint of workers. Unemployment benefits may be described by two variables: 
the replacement ratio and the benefit duration. Replacement ratios are measured as the ratio of total 
unemployment benefits for the first year to average net earnings. They have generally decreased in 
the last two decades, although this has varied across countries. Unemployment benefit duration is a 
measure of the amount of time the unemployed keep on receiving unemployment benefits. 
                                                      
    We have considered, at an early stage, the degree of wage bargaining co-ordination, but it was found to be 
insignificant in the estimations and, in general, highly correlated with other institutions. 
    It should be noted that this is a quite imperfect measure of unionisation. There are countries with low affiliation rates 
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6Developments in unemployment benefit duration during the last two decades have varied 
significantly across European countries: some have extended it, some have reduced it. 
Finally, labour taxes are also expected to be a relevant determinant of women’s participation. Any 
increase in taxes leading to lower net wages will increase participation in order to keep the income 
level constant. However, the substitution effect (cheaper leisure) will tend to lower participation. 
Our labour taxes variable measures the sum of income and consumption taxes from countries’ 
national accounts. It shows a high dispersion among EU-15 countries and an increase in all 
countries (but the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) in the last two decades.  
Closely related with institutional factors, labour market programmes are also expected to have 
some influence on female participation. This influence could be direct, by allowing individuals to 
qualify for unemployment benefits, or indirect, by increasing the probability to find a job after 
participating in the programme. However, the lack of international comparable data by age and 
gender groups does not allow us to include labour market programme variables in our study.    
The vector Zit contains variables suggested by economic theory that are usually found in empirical 
studies. Economic theory gives a central role to potential earnings or potential wages as a 
determinant of participation.  The participation decision of women is usually modelled as women 
choosing between market work, household work and leisure. If potential earnings in the market 
(relative to home productivity) increase, participation decisions will be influenced by an income 
effect, which will increase demand for leisure given the higher income, and a substitution effect. 
Labour market participation will increase if the positive substitution effect is larger than the 
income effect. 
In practice, it is very difficult to find adequate variables to measure potential earnings of each 
group of women considered. Average wages for a specific group of women could reflect skill 
composition and self-selection rather than participation behaviour. An alternative measure used in 
the literature is the level of education of the relevant group.  In the case of women, this variable is 
likely to capture not only higher potential wages associated to higher human capital, but also 
preferences, women with higher education, who have invested more in human capital 
accumulation are likely to have higher preferences for market production. To disentangle these 
potential effects is very difficult and in general the coefficient of education in participation 
equations cannot be interpreted as capturing exclusively potential earning.  
                                                      
   See Johansson (2002) for a recent study on the effects of labour market programs on labour force participation in 
Sweden. 
    See for example the seminal work of Mincer (1962). 
   One major drawback of education measures used as proxies of human capital is that it does not take into account on-           











9In addition to the above mentioned shortcomings, it should be added the scarcity of valid data. 
Measures of average wages by gender and age group are not available for our sample. In the case 
of education, some comparable indicators exist across countries but only as 5 year averages.   
The prevailing economic conditions are also expected to influence participation decisions. To 
control for the economic business cycle we included the overall unemployment rate. We prefer 
labour market related proxies to capture business cycle developments to alternative measures such 
as the output gap because omitting the unemployment rate could imply that the institutions’ 
coefficients also captures the indirect effect of institutions on participation via unemployment. In 
addition, the unemployment rate is expected to better capture cyclical labour market pressures than 
other business cycle indicators. Additionally, we include average aggregate real wages, which are 
expected to account for the general macro economic and labour market conditions. The potential 
problem of endogeneity of these variables is diminished by the fact that our dependent variable is 
defined for a specific group of population and consequently its potential feedback to aggregate 
unemployment and/or wages should be limited. Nevertheless, in most of our specifications, we 
instrumented these variables using lags, real productivity, and a measure of the output gap. 
Not only general economic conditions are relevant but also sectoral developments. The relative 
importance of service activities in the EU-15 has increased, which has fostered certain types of 
occupation and work arrangements (e.g. part-time jobs) that are expected to favour female 
participation.  
The error term in our equations, εit , is likely to suffer from autocorrelation. The population in the 
sample moves in and out of each age group over time, these slow moving cohort effects will be the 
responsible for autocorrelation. Including lags of the dependent variable among the explanatory 
variables would likely bias the estimated by capturing these slow moving components of the error. 
Instead, estimations are performed using feasible GLS allowing for autoregressive, AR(1), and 
heteroskedastic residuals. We implemented unit root and cointegration test for our panel to ensure 
that our results are not based on spurious regressions. However, due to the short time series 
dimension of our panel the unit roots and cointegration results must be interpreted with caution.  
 
3. Results  
In this section we estimate participation equations for three different age groups of women using 
time series of annual macro data for a panel of 12 EU-15 countries.   
                                                      
    See Barro and Lee (2000) and De la Fuente and Domenech (2002). 









113.1. Prime-age females’ participation 
Participation rates of prime age women in the 12 countries of our sample rank from below 60% in 
Spain, Ireland and Italy to well over 80% in Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Within each country 
prime age women are the most active ones, with the remarkable exception of the Netherlands 
When comparing the average participation rate for this group during the 1980s with the one during 
female participation (up to 20 percentage points in Spain and the Netherlands) in all countries 
except Sweden, Finland and Denmark. However, in these three Nordic countries, prime-age 
participation rate was already very high in the 1980s and had therefore little room for a further rise. 
An interesting feature of the cross-country dynamics of participation of prime age women is the 
catching up process that has taken place during the last two decades. The countries with lowest 
participation rates have witnessed the highest increases and vice versa, although the ranking of 
participation rates levels across countries has hardly changed from one decade to the next. 
The main specificity of this age group is that it includes the period of the life cycle when women 
have children. Indeed, in 2000, the average age of European women at the birth of the first child 
ranged from nearly 27 years old in Portugal to almost 30 years old in the Netherlands. Having a 
family, and especially having small children, conditions the preferences of women as it implies 
more opportunities for home production. Consequently, when estimating the participation equation 
for this group one needs to account for the relationship between fertility and participation 
decisions. In fact, having children and participating to the labour force could be understood as joint 
decisions. It could be argued however that causality is more likely to go from fertility to 
participation because having children is a permanent decision, while participation is reversible, and 
therefore can adjust in the short run. In addition to the general determinants of female participation 
discussed in the previous section, we include then a fertility variable (fertility rates) among the 
explanatory variables and try to alleviate potential endogeneity biases by instrumenting it with 
using lags.  
Other specific determinants of participation for this group are institutional features like 
maternal/parental leave or the availability of childcare services. These, together with the possibility 
to take up a part-time job, could play an essential role on the arbitrage faced by prime age women 
between leisure, market work and home production, by enabling women to reconcile motherhood 
with professional life.  Therefore, these features are expected to have a positive impact on prime 
age female participation and are included in our equation specifications. 
                                                      
   The extended use of flexible working arrangements in the Netherlands allows young people to conciliate studying 
and working activities. 
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where young and prime age women have similar participation rates.




13Estimation results for prime age women are presented in Table 1. In order to check integration and 
cointegration properties in our panel, we performed a Fisher test as suggested by Maddala and Wu 
(1999): twice the sum of the log of p-values from the individual tests is a chi-squared distribution 
with degrees of freedom twice the number of cross-sections (12 countries). We combined p values 
(MacKinnon's approximations) from the Phillips Perron test and accepted the null of a unit root for 
prime age female participation. The same exercise implemented for the residuals of the regressions 
in Table 1 resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Therefore we reject the 
hypothesis of spurious regressions.  The common (to all the countries) autocorrelation 
coefficients that we estimated ranked from 0.4 - 0.55 depending on the specification.
Labour market institutions appear to be relevant for participation decisions of this group. The 
estimation coefficients of the unemployment benefit variables (both, replacement ratio and 
duration) and union density are negative, significant and very stable across specifications, while 
employment protection is found not to be significant. Labour taxes, as measured in Nickell and 
Nunziata (2001), do not appear statistically significant. This was expected because it measures 
country average tax revenues including income and consumption taxes, while the relevant variable 
to capture the impact of taxes on prime age female participation should be the average tax rate of 
the second earner in the household. This tax rate is not available for our sample because some of 
the countries have family taxation and it is not possible to allocate the various tax reliefs between 
household partners. Additionally, there are difficulties to make comparable the different tax 
income legislation across countries. Nevertheless, an interesting attempt to construct a measure of 
second earner tax rate for OECD countries has been made in Jaumotte (2003).  We introduced 
this variable in our estimations, but it turned out having a non-significant coefficient.  
Maternity/parental leave measured in weeks (taken from Gauthier and Bortnik, 2001) seem to have 
an encouraging effect on participation if the leave is not too long. According to our estimations, 
the effect of maternity/parental leave becomes negative after approximately 10 months.  
If institutions had remained at the 1980's level the participation of women aged 25-54 would have 
increased in the Netherlands 20% less than predicted,  almost 30% less than predicted in Portugal 
or  20%  less UK. While on the other hand, the development of institutions has prevented 
participation from further increase in Italy and Finland, this is mainly due to the rise of 
unemployment benefit replacement ratio in these two countries. All this can be seeing in the first 
panel of Chart 10, which gives an idea of the net contribution that the development of some of the 
variables considered in the regressions make to the total change in female labour force 
participation in each country. It compares changes in participation predicted by our models with 
                                                      
   Similar tests were performed for each demographic group and in every case we rejected the hypothesis of spurious 
regressions. 
   For the main specifications of this table we also tried running pooled OLS including period and country effects, the 
overall fit was good, adjusted R2 over 0.95 . 












16those obtained had specific explanatory variables remained constant since the beginning of the 
1980s.  
We encountered difficulties to find a proxy of childcare availability for our sample. We tried three 
different variables to account for childcare availability and child benefits, namely public childcare 
expenditure per child in formal day care from Jaumotte (2003), family allowances per child 
(Gauthier, 2003) and public expenditure in child benefits as percentage of GDP (calculated from 
Eurostat data). None of them was found to be statistically significant, failing then to capture the 
potential positive impact of childcare availability on female participation.   
Regarding to the influence of prevailing economic conditions, their role is only captured by the 
unemployment rate, with an statistically significant and negative coefficient, which reflects 
discouragement effects, due to low attachment to the labour market. Our measure of aggregate 
wage turns to be non significant despite several attempts to improve it. In order to account for the 
influence of potential earnings we constructed a measure of real wage for women using the 
average wage gap (unadjusted for skills) provided by Eurostat and gender weights in total 
employees. Data prior to 1994 was assumed on the basis of qualitative trends reported by the 
European Industrial Relations Observatory. This variable did not provide more satisfying results. 
basis, did not provide concluding results.   
  As regards the relationship between fertility and participation, a fact well-documented in the 
recent literature is that some European countries with high female participation also have high 
fertility rates.  Our data confirm this for Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, while the 
relationship is negative for the rest of the countries in our sample. Therefore, in our specifications, 
we interact fertility rates with a dummy for Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands, allowing for 
an asymmetric effect of fertility on participation rates. Fertility rates turn out to be significant and 
positive for this group of countries with a net coefficient of around 0.4/0.5, and negative and also 
statistically significant for the rest of European countries.  
The availability of part-time jobs, which can help women to reconcile work and family life, is 
found to have a positive influence on prime age female participation. The most remarkable case is 
Ireland where according to chat 10a, part-time jobs are responsible for about 12 points (almost 
40%) of the total predicted increase in prime age participation and the Netherlands were they 
account for more than 30%. 
In the results shown in Table 1 we used as a proxy to the availability of part-time jobs the 
percentage of females (of all ages) working part–time. Alternatively, we tried employment in 
services over total employment since part-time jobs are concentrated in the services sector and 
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Similarly, several interpolation of different indicators of education available on a 5-year average 
 17
17 employment in the service sector has been booming over the last two decades. Results were quite 
similar.  
Finally, we introduced the percentage of parliamentary seats occupied by women as a proxy for 
gender discrimination. It is meant to possibly reflect the changing role of women in the society. 
Interestingly, it is found to be statistically significant and positive in some of the specifications.  
The ability of the estimations to explain the evolution over time of participation rates for each 
country is examined in Chart 4. It shows a good overall fit for each country.  
3.2. Participation of females aged 55-64 
The participation rate of women aged 55-64 have slightly increased in most of the countries of our 
sample, with the exception of France and Finland (see Chart 5). However, the changes recorded 
between the 1980s and the 1990s were relatively small and did not affect the overall ranking of 
participation across countries. Indeed, Sweden, Denmark, Ireland and the UK remained as the 
countries with the highest participation rate, while Belgium, France and the Netherlands did not 
show any significant catch up between both decades. 
In addition to the general determinants of participation previously discussed, older women’s 
participation decisions are expected to be influenced by some specific institutional features. Two 
specific institutions are considered in this group, both trying to capture the retirement system 
framework. The first one is the official retirement age, which should allow taking into account 
differences in the legal systems across countries. It has remained broadly stable over time in most 
countries, but the differences across countries are significant. The second institutional factor tries 
to capture differences in social protection across countries, by measuring the expenditure on social 
protection for old aged people as a percentage of GDP. In general, this ratio, which shows some 
heterogeneity in social protection at the country level, has increased over time, partly reflecting the 
ageing of the population in all European countries.   
We have also included in the estimates of this group the participation rate of prime-age women 
 This variable tries to capture cohort effects, i.e. the fact that the participation 
behaviour of women aged 55-64 today is linked to their participation decisions when they were 25-
54 years old. Chart 6 illustrates cohort effects at the euro area level. The horizontal movement 
along each line shows how participation evolves with age, showing a decline for the oldest groups, 
while the vertical distance between lines reflects the cohort effect, which appears non-negligible 
for women. Indeed, for those 45-49 years old, we can see that the cohort effect on the participation 
rate has been of around 20 percentage points in the past 15 years.  
                                                      
   Variables on retirement systems are from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999). See Annex. 
   Constructed using ten-year data published by the International Labour Office (ILO), which have been interpolated to 
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lagged 10 years.   
19
18
19The results of the estimations are shown in Table 2. The hypothesis of spurious regressions is 
rejected and the autocorrelation coefficients common to all countries was about 0.54. 
Starting with the cyclical factors, which are measured by the unemployment rate and real wages, 
both are found to be non-significant. This suggests that participation of the oldest group is mainly 
explained by factors of a more structural nature. Indeed, column 2 in Table 2 shows that cohort 
effects play a determinant role in explaining the participation rate of this group. Cohort effects are 
expected to measure mainly preferences, but, indirectly, also institutional effects and social norms. 
Chart 10b shows that keeping the cohort effect at the early 1980s levels would have resulted in a 
lower increased in participation levels in all the countries, cohort effects have even prevented Italy, 
France, Finland, and Spain from null or negative (predicted) increases in participation.  
As regards the institutional framework, retirement age, as expected, is positively correlated with 
participation. In this case, however, we need to control for the influence of Spain in our panel, 
where the retirement age appears to be relatively less binding than in other countries. Expenditure 
in old age social protection programmes is also found significant and has a negative effect on 
participation.  Finally, most of the remaining labour market institutions, including union density, 
employment protection and labour taxes, have negative effects on participation.  Remarkably, the 
changes in the relevant institutions for this group since 1980 in Germany, the Netherlands and 
Portugal, can explain half of the change in participation predicted by the model (see Chart 10b). 
Chart 7 examines the ability of the equation 2 in Table 2 to explain the evolution over time of 
participation rates for each country and it shows, overall, a good fit for each country. 
Young European women, aged 15 to 24 years old, make up for a far more heterogeneous group 
varies widely across countries, from no higher than 32% in Belgium to nearly 70% in the 
Netherlands in 2000. Yet, they all share two common characteristics. First, their participation rates 
are generally lower than that of prime-age women and higher than that of older women (aged 55 to 
64 years old). Second, unlike their elders, participation rates of young women declined between the 
1980s and the 1990s in virtually all European countries, with the remarkable exception of the 
Netherlands (see Chart 8). On average, the participation rate of young European women fell by 
nearly 8 percentage points between 1980 and 2000. The magnitude of that fall, however, differs 
substantially among countries. In general, countries with a high participation rate of young women 
in the 1980s (such as Denmark or the United Kingdom) saw less of a fall in participation. 
Along with the list of general determinants of participation discussed earlier, it is likely that young 
women are specifically influenced by three additional factors. First, enrolment in education 
                                                      
  Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) find that this variable does not influence participation decisions for older males. Our 








than their elders as far as participation to the labour force is concerned. Their participation rate 
Participation of females aged 15-24  3.3. appears to be extremely relevant for this age group. Young women may indeed decide either to 
continue studying in order to increase their skills and theirs chances to easily get a job in the future, 
or simply, to avoid being unemployed. Second, flexible types of contracts (i.e. temporary and part-
time jobs) should exert a positive influence on participation for the younger age group. It should be 
seen as an incentive both for firms, since their costs are lower, and for workers, since they provide 
a temporary attachment or a “stepping stone” to get a better job. Third, minimum wages have often 
been presented in the literature as an impediment to hiring young workers – who have lower skills 
and productivity – and could therefore also be a relevant determinant of young women 
participation rates. 
Estimation results for the younger age group are presented in Table 3. The hypothesis of spurious 
regressions is rejected and the autocorrelation coefficients common to all countries ranked from 
0.45 to 0.54 depending on the specification. 
The first column shows the results for the basic specification. By contrast with other age groups, 
the institutional framework seems to have little bearing in explaining participation of younger 
European women. This may be surprising since, of all women, the youngest, freshly arrived on the 
labour market, would probably be assigned the most prominent “outsider” status in an “insider-
outsider” model. However, in many European countries, young people – since they have never 
worked before - are not entitled to social or unemployment benefits, so that their participation 
behaviour cannot be influenced by these types of institutions. Taxes appear to be the only 
significant factor consistently discouraging the labour supply of young women in all estimations. 
Labour taxes increased in all European countries (but the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) 
between the 1980s and the 1990s. Their significant negative influence on participation may suggest 
that, for young women, the substitution effect of taxes exceeds the favourable income effect they 
might have on participation. In other words, participating to the labour force would not bring along 
sufficient income to make participation worthwhile compared with staying out of the labour force. 
Looking at country details (Chart 10c), we find that changes in labour taxes did not have an 
homogenous impact across countries. For example, the impact of labour taxes counteracted the 
decrease in young female participation in most European countries, but it had a clear worsening 
effect in some others (in particular, France, Ireland and Italy). Other institutional features do not 
appear to have a strong influence on young female participation. 
Economic conditions have a significant impact on the participation rate of young women. The 
lower is the unemployment rate the higher is participation. This surely illustrates the 
discouragement effect that labour market developments may have on specific groups. Positive 
economic developments increase the probability to find a job and attract people on the labour 
market. Inversely, sluggish developments on that same labour market discourage people from 
participating. Wage variables give unsatisfying results. Average wages do not seem to matter in 
explaining young women participation. However, this may only be due to the shortcomings of our 
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problems. Going to university or going to find a job can indeed be intermingled decisions. 
Therefore, in an attempt to control for potential endogeneity problems, education enrolment is 
instrumented using lags. As expected, deciding to remain in the education system negatively 
affects the participation rate of young women. There is no doubt that the continued rise of the 
proportion of young people in education observed in our sample has significantly reduced the 
participation rate of this group. Chart 10c confirms that education has had a big impact on all 
European countries, confirming the driving force that increased education enrolment had on 
decreasing young participation.  
Column 2 estimates the impact of the part-time ratio on young female participation. In order to 
take into account the likely endogeneity problem attached to the use of a part-time ratio specific to 
the youngest age group, we reported the results with the share of part-time employment in the 15-
64 age group. Results show that part-time contracts have a positive influence on participation. 
Chart 10c shows that the rapid growth in part-time employment has had a fairly homogenous 
impact on young female participation. With only a few exceptions (in particular Denmark and 
Sweden), part-time employment has significantly contributed to limit the decline in young female 
participation. In an alternative estimation (column 3) we have also included the temporary ratio but 
it does not appear to be significant. This can be due to the fact that these types of contracts can 
interact between themselves, i.e. part-time contracts can be temporary or permanent, and therefore 
some overlap may arise.  
Chart 9 reports the ability of equation 2 to explain the evolution over time of participation rates for 
each country, showing broadly a good fit for each country. 
Apparently, these results point to a small influence of the institutional framework in explaining the 
participation rates of young European women. By contrast, choices of further education or flexible 
types of work seem to play a prominent role. Yet, staying at school or at university, albeit surely 
depending on preferences, may indirectly be highly influenced by the government subsidies and 
grants to education, which in Europe are significantly larger that on the other side of the Atlantic. 
Similarly, flexible types of work are generally more highly regulated in Europe than they are in the 
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leave minimum wage out of our estimations. 
mum wage reduce the number of observations by more than half. We therefore decided to  
this information being available for no more than five countries, estimations   including mini- 4. Discussion and conclusions 
Why don’t European women work more? Is it due to the burden of excessively stringent labour 
market institutions or to general preference for leisure? By stepping away from the micro-analysis 
of individual determinants of participation, this study provides an interesting viewpoint from which 
to consider the question. 
Using annual data for a panel of 12 EU-15 countries over the period 1980-2000, this paper has 
looked at the role that economic, institutional and social factors have played in explaining female 
participation rates and their developments in the last two decades. The analysis was performed by 
estimating participation equations for 3 different age groups (namely, the young – 15 to 24 years 
old –, the prime-age – 25 to 54 – and the older – 55 to 64 –). 
The influence of general economic variables on participation is not even across age groups. In 
particular, the unemployment rate, which is meant to mainly capture labour market pressures 
arising from business cycle fluctuations, appeared to have some relevance in explaining 
participation, albeit only for the youngest and prime-age women. As expected, high unemployment 
tends to have a discouragement effect on these women, who, when considering that they have little 
chance to find a job, refrain from participating to the labour force. Other indicators of the 
prevailing economic conditions such as average real wages did not appear to be statistically 
significantly, but this might be due to the difficulty of properly measuring a relevant wage variable. 
For all three age groups considered, the strictness of labour market institutions negatively affects 
participation decisions. Indeed, the declining tightness of the institutional framework ruling labour 
markets in some countries over the last two decades appeared to have significantly favoured 
women’s participation, in particular of the older age group. We also found that measures aimed at 
reconciling motherhood with professional life, such as maternity leave, should favour participation 
to the labour force. 
Along with the changing institutional framework, a number of specific decisions influenced by 
preferences, institutions and social norms appeared to have driven participation developments of 
the different age groups. For example, for the younger age group, the increasing use of flexible 
forms of work (such as part-time employment) has been found to explain a large part of 
participation developments between the 1980s and the 1990s. Education enrolment, which can be 
seen as an alternative to finding a job or being unemployed, has been a major driving force behind 
the decline in young female participation. Turning to prime-age female, a fertility variable, which 
can be seen as the outcome of the decision to have children versus participation to the labour force, 
significantly curbs labour force participation.  
Finally, the participation of oldest age group appeared significantly influenced by the lifetime 
behaviour of older women. If they did not participate at an earlier age, they are not likely to 
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Europe. Institutional factors, together with preferences and economic factors have shaped female 
participation decisions. Therefore, for the successful design of efficient policy measures that can 
bring inactives to the labour force, help Europe to be more dynamic and catch-up with the United 
States in terms of hours worked per head, and thereby, GDP per capita, it is very relevant to 
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Panel data estimates of participation rates 
Prime-age females 25-54 




UB Replc. Ratio  -0.393 -0.361 -0.350 -0.297 -0.286 
  (-3.29) (-3.78) (-4.36) (-3.46) (-3.39) 
       
UB duration  -0.476 -0.410 -0.538 -0.581 -0.581 
  (-4.2)  (-3.69) (-5.31) (-5.30) (-5.35) 
       
Union density  -0.887 -0.929 -0.819 -0.698 -0.644 
  (-3.16) (-3.68) (-3.65) (-2.91) (-2.52) 
       
Empl. Protection  0.086      
  (0.89)      
       
Taxes  0.354      
  (1.26)      
Maternity leave weeks     0.033  0.032  0.032 
     (3.36)  (3.06)  (2.96) 
       
Maternity leave weeks 
squared*100     -0.047  -0.043  -0.040 




Real wage  -0.224 -0.220 -0.159    -0.179 
  (-1.26) (-1.28) (-1.03)    (-1.05) 
       
Fertility rate  -0.337 -0.344 -0.469 -0.470 -0.496 
  (-3.75) (-3.78) (-5.22) (-3.78) (-4.07) 
       
Fer.rate*Nordic&Netherlands 0.981 0.981 1.126 0.873 0.837 
  (6.14) (5.86) (6.83) (4.25) (4.20) 
       
Unemployment rate  -0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -0.011 -0.016 
  (-3.7)  (-3.47) (-1.63) (-3.02) (-4.26) 
       
Female part-time  0.029 0.029 0.033 0.030 0.028 
  (8.86) (8.81)  (10.06)  (9.89) (9.29) 
       
% Women Parliamentary 
seats  0.536 0.452 0.446 0.143 0.113 
  (2.47) (2.17) (2.11) (0.65) (0.53) 
       
Obs. No.  196 196 184 184 184 
Note: Except when indicated, estimations are performed by FGLS including time and country dummies. * 2 
stages FGLS. Instruments not included in the equation are lagged (4 and 5 lags) fertility, lagged unemployment 
(2 and 3 lags), productivity and output gap. t-statistics in parentheses. Sample period: 1984-2000. Countries 
include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
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Table 2 
Panel data estimates of participation rates 
Old females 55-64 
 
Note: Estimations are performed by 2 stage FGLS including 
time and country dummies. Instruments not included in the 
equation are, lagged unemployment (2 and 3 lags), 
productivity and output gap. t-statistics in parentheses. 
Sample period: 1980-2000. Countries include Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. For 
variable definitions see the text and annex. 














Retirement age * Spain   -0.015 
(-4.52) 
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Panel data estimates of participation rates 
Young females 15-24 































































Temporary employment  - -  0.233 
(1.22) 
Obs. No.  172  172  172 
Note: Estimations are performed by 2 stages FGLS including time and country 
dummies. The instruments not included in the equations are labour productivity, 
the output gap and lags. t-statistics in parentheses. Sample period: 1985-2000. 
Countries include Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
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Chart 2: Labour force participation in the US  
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Sources: Eurostat, OECD and ECB calculations.  
 
Chart 4: Females’ participation developments, 1980-2000, 25-54 years old 















1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
be dk fi fr
ge ir it nt
pt sp sw uk













1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
be dk fi fr
ge ir it nt
pt sp sw uk













1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
be dk fi fr
ge ir it nt
pt sp sw uk




Working Paper Series No. 454
March 2005
while points below the line indicate a decline.  
Note:  The chart displays average female participation rates for the 1990s, plotted against the average rates 
cyclical movements in participation. The 45 degrees line is added in order to facilitate the comparison 
for the 1980s for all EU countries in our sample.  Averaging the two decades is an attempt to control for the 
of the developments.  Points above the line imply an increase in participation between the two decades  , while Chart 5: Labour force participation of women 55 to 64 years old, 1980s versus 1990s 





























Sources: Eurostat, OECD and ECB calculations.  






















































Sources: Eurostat, OECD and ECB calculations.  
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March 2005Chart 7: Females’ participation developments, 1980-2000, 55-64 years old 
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Chart 8: Labour force participation of women 15 to 24 years old, 1980s versus 1990s 



























Sources: Eurostat, OECD and ECB calculations. 
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March 2005Chart 9: Females’ participation developments, 1980-2000, 15-24 years old 
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March 2005Chart 10: Contribution of different factors to participation developments
(*)  
(in percentage points) 
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Note: This chart compares predicted changes in participation with those obtained if specific explanatory 
variables are maintained at the levels of 1980, in order to show the relevance of the developments in each 
selected variable to explain changes in participation. As regards institutions, all institutional determinants 
shown in Tables 1 to 3 are considered (models 2, 2 and 3 respectively), excluding those that are non-
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Participation rate: defined as the percentage of people in the labour force in the total working age 
population. The total labour force (or currently active population) comprises all persons aged 15 to 
64 who are either employed or actively looking for a job. The working age population comprises 
all people aged between 15 and 64 years old. The data on participation rates and unemployment 
rates are derived from the annual European Community Labour Force Survey, which has been 
conducted every year in the spring since 1983.
22 OECD and ILO data have been used to extend 
participation rates back to 1980. 
Unemployment rate: defined as the percentage of people actively looking for a job into the labour 
force. The data on unemployment rates are derived from the annual European Community Labour 
Force Survey, which has been conducted every year in the spring since 1983. OECD data have 
been used to prolong the unemployment rate back to 1980. 
Real wage: defined as nominal wages deflated by the GDP deflator, obtained from the European 
Commission AMECO database.  
Vacancy rate: defined as the number of vacant jobs as a percentage of the labour force. Vacancy 
data are obtained from the OECD.  
Fertility rate: defined as the mean number of children that would be born alive to a woman during 
her lifetime if she were to pass her childbearing years conforming to the fertility rates by age of a 
given year. It is obtained from the NewCronos database, Eurostat. 
Part-time ratio: defined as the fraction of part-time workers in total employment, obtained from 
the annual European Community Labour Force Survey. 
Services ratio: defined as the percentage of employment in the services sector, obtained from the 
European Commission AMECO database.  
Old-age social protection: includes old age pensions and the provision of goods and services 
(other than medical care) to the elderly, as a percentage of GDP. These data are drawn from 
European Social Statistics, Eurostat. 
Children benefit: Three measures of children benefits were used. First, a measure including 
support (other than medical care) in connection with pregnancy, childbirth and the care of children 
and other dependent family members, as a percentage of GDP. These data are drawn from 
European Social Statistics, Eurostat. Second, we used monthly family allowances for the first, 
second and third child as a percentage of monthly earnings. These data are drawn from the 
                                                      
22   Eurostat compiles these data and a detailed description of the sampling methods and adjustment procedures can be 
found in the latest Labour Force Survey – Methods and definitions, 1998. There is no information available for 
countries before they joined the European Union (i.e. for Spain and Portugal prior to 1986, for Austria and Finland 
prior to 1995). The series were extended to 1980, whenever possible, using OECD Labour Force Statistics or 
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formal day care and pre-primary school (from Jaumotte, 2003).  
Maternity/parental leave: refers to the official duration of maternity/parental leave in the event of a 
child birth (in weeks). In some countries, this leave may be shared between parents. The data is 
drawn from the Comparative Maternity, parental, and childcare leave and benefits database 
(Gauthier, 2001). 
Women parliamentary seats: defined as the percentage of seats in the parliament occupied by 
women. United Nations Statistics and ECB calculations. 
Unemployment benefit replacement ratio: refers to first year of unemployment benefits, averaged 
over family types of recipients, as a percentage of average earnings before tax. Data are taken from 
Labour Market Statistics Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
Unemployment benefit duration: obtained as a weighted average of the replacement rate received 
the second and third years of unemployment and in the fourth and fifth years, relative in both cases 
to the replacement rate in the first year. Data are taken from Labour Market Statistics Database, 
Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
Union density: defined as the ratio of union members to total employees. Data are taken from 
Labour Market Statistics Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
Employment protection: measures in a range between 0 and 2 the strictness of employment 
protection. Data are taken from Labour Market Statistics Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
Labour taxes: defined as the sum of the employment tax rate, the direct tax rate and the indirect tax 
rate. Data are taken from Labour Market Statistics Database, Nickell and Nunziata (2001). 
Retirement age: defined as the official retirement age. Data are taken from Blöndal S. and S. 
Scarpetta (1999). 
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